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Abstract
Our general objective is to characterize the recent and well publicized di¤usion of Twitter
among politicians in the United States 111th House of Representatives. Ultimately, Barack
Obama, Facebook and peers matter when it comes to the propensity and speed of Twitter
adoption. A basic analysis of the distribution of rst Tweets over time reveals clustering around
the Presidents inauguration; which holds regardless whether the adopter is Democratic or Re-
publican, or an incumbent or newcomer. After we characterize which representatives are most
likely to adopt Twitter, we conrm the widespread belief that Facebook and Twitter are indeed
complementary technology. Given their perceived desire for accessible government, a surprising
result is that Republicans are more likely to adopt Twitter than Democrats. Finally, using the
exact dates of each adopters rst Tweet, we demonstrate that the di¤usion of Twitter is faster
for those representatives with a larger number of peers already using the technology, where
peers are dened by two social networks: (1) Politicians representing the same state; and (2)
politicians belonging to the same committees; especially so for those in committee networks. We
later argue that this observed behavior can be rationalized by social learning. To complete our
characterization of Twitter use in congress, we demonstrate the existence of opportunity costs,
using ex post usage statistics for each adopter; participation is constrained by how many bills a
representative has initiated, as well as whether he/she already participates in Facebook.
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1 Introduction
The Library of Congress recently announced that all Twitter posts will be archived in their digital
data collection1. Even if Twitter turns out to be a fad, it is hard to be skeptical of Twitters
historical relevance, as it represents a movement away from traditional media sources, such as
newspapers and television, towards media that draws its material from the general population.
Nowhere is the e¤ect of Twitter more profound than in politics. Motivated by the desire for
transparent government, Twitter is becoming increasingly popular among politicians as a way to
connect with constituents. In general, social media can benet both the politician and his/her
constituents. Constituents can stay informed about issues that their representatives are working
on, while representatives can garner grass-roots support for their policies and their overall brand.
For our paper we ask, which politicians adopt Twitter, and among the adopters, who will adopt rst.
Our main conclusion is that adoption is largely driven by some complementarity with Facebook
use, while early adoption is largely driven by peer e¤ects.
The setting for our study is the adoption of Twitter among all active members in the United
States 111th House of Representatives. Under this setting, we rst verify the common belief
that Facebook and Twitter are complementary communications technology. A representative who
has a Facebook account is signicantly more likely to adopt Twitter. This result relies on the
identication assumption that Facebook was adopted before the decision to adopt Twitter, which
is supported by anecdotal evidence. Furthermore, we argue that the e¤ect from Facebook is not
simply because it may account for the constituents underlying preferences for social media by
noting that a large number of politicians take use Twitter from Facebook, and link their Twitter
pages to their Facebook pages. When we look closer into this e¤ect, we nd that the Facebook
e¤ect does not di¤er across di¤erent types of representatives, based on age, party, and tenure; which,
is suggestive that the positive spillover associated with Facebook is enjoyed uniformly across the
sample of representatives. Our most surprising result from our analysis of Twitter adoption is that
Democrats are less likely to adopt Twitter. Their advocacy of open government seems to contradict
this non-adoption of Twitter. Furthermore, representatives are more likely to adopt Twitter after
the 2008 congressional election if they received a high percentage of votes during that election; this
suggests that Twitter adoption is more likely to be driven by a representatives desire to maintain
existing constituent support, rather than advertising their platform and generating more support.
In summary, Republicans who won by large margins and have Facebook accounts are the most
1April 14, 2010 at http://twitter.com/librarycongress.
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likely to adopt.
After characterizing entry into Twitter, we are interested in studying how exactly the di¤uses.
In particular, how does peer adoption a¤ect the speed of Twitter adoption? To answer this question,
we use the date in which a representatives rst Twitter message was posted as a proxy for the
true date of adoption. With this information, we can identify the exact order, day-by-day, in which
all of the adopters adopted. Using this granular time of adoption information, we consider two
situations in which the representatives can interact. The rst is through a state network, in that
politicians that operate within the same state most likely deal with similar issues and are most
likely to interact; and the second is through a committee network, in which politicians who sit in
the same committee(s) are most likely to interact. Although we consider peers coming from both
networks for our analysis, we believe that the committee network is a more realistic setting for
social interaction2.
Simple regression uncovers a signicant and economically important peer e¤ect, in that a stan-
dard deviation change in the number of peers belonging to the committee network accelerates
Twitter adoption by 3 days. When we group peers based on party a¢ liation, we nd divergence
in peer e¤ects across parties, in that Republican peers in a committee network have a signicantly
larger e¤ect than that of their Democratic counterparts. In general, we argue that these delays are
generated by behavior consistent with social learning. The peer e¤ects are most pronounced when
social learning is the most important, such as for representatives with little experience with social
media and/or well-connected.
Representatives face uncertainty when they decide to adopt Twitter. There is no guarantee
that Twitter will improve their image or help them pass along information to their constituents.
However, they can resolve some of this uncertainty by consulting with their peers who have al-
ready signed up. This learning process within a social network3 should be especially fast if the
representative has access to a large sample of past adoptersopinions. Each piece of information
brings the representative closer to learning the true state; and given that the decision to adopt
by others is a positive signal for Twitters merit, the option value of delay should subsequently
decrease with the number of past adopters. That is, once a representative receives enough "good
news" signals through social interactions, its benet from adopting Twitter (i.e. opportunity cost
of delay) exceeds the benet from waiting for more information from others (i.e. option value of
2See Brock and Durlauf (2004) and Manski (2000) for surveys about emprical models with social interactions.
3Social networks are important for information di¤usion. The study by Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008,2009)
show that sell-side analysts provide much better recommendations about companies that they have alumni connections
with.
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delay)4. As more peers adopt Twitter, the number of future adopters that a representative can
potentially learn from by waiting to adopt declines; so too should the incentive to wait.
The intuition behind "wait-and-see" learning is largely guided by the theoretical work by Caplin
and Leahy (1998), Chamley and Gale (1994) and the theoretical extensions that followed5. If the
past adoption decision of neighbors or peers has informative value, then a potential adopter has an
incentive to delay his/her action so as to exploit the information externalities. But with enough
information on hand, this incentive to delay should subside, so as to speed up the adoption of
Twitter. Unlike standard models information externalities materialize via signals or actions alone,
our story likely involves both, as social interactions upgrade the informational value of just observing
the Twitter adoption among peers alone.
Our identication of peer e¤ects is subject to the standard Manski (1993) critique. We rst
refute the claim that exogenous characteristics of peers are generating this e¤ect by including the
number of Democratic peers in the original regressions. Doing so does not change our results.
Moreover, our results are robust to correlated e¤ects associated with each network itself. Next, we
acknowledge the fact that a large number of rst Tweets were centered around Barack Obamas
inauguration, and omit those observations from our analysis; doing so does not weaken our results,
but instead, increases the magnitude of the committee peer e¤ect. The last concern we address is
the role of unobserved heterogeneity, which could bias our peer e¤ect estimates. Publicly available
ex post Twitter usage statistics for each representatives URL are used to proxy for unobserved het-
erogeneity related to unobserved preferences and information, which are later shown empirically to
have insignicant and virtually negligible - in magnitude - relationships with the speed of adoption.
This nding motivates us to ask whether participation is largely driven by Twitter usage costs,
rather than accrued benet. Using an approach analagous to Goldfarb and Prince (2008), the data
reveals that the intensity of Twitter use is constrained by the number of bills each representative
has sponsored as well as whether that representative holds a Facebook account.
By exploiting information about timing into our analysis, we are able to analyze peer e¤ects
and social learning without the threat of simultaneity, in that the adoption activity among a
representatives peers occurred (well) before his/her own observed decision. To some extent, this
makes our paper very similar to Conley and Udrys (2010) empirical analysis of learning within
social networks, who also exploit timing information6. What separates our work is our focus on the
4Please refer to the appendix for further details.
5These theories have been used primarily to explain delays in investment of rms and government. See Chamley
(2004) for a summary.
6Jackson (2008) remarks that timing information is a potentially powerful approach to avoid typical reection
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speed of adoption among adopters, while their focus is on the propensity to adopt. One advantage of
their work though is that unlike our denitions of social networks, they are able to dene networks
exactly, in that surveyed agents identify who they communicate with.
Our goal of identifying social learning places this paper in a small but growing set of empir-
ical literature. In addition to Conley and Udry, recent empirical applications of social learning
include Morretis (2010) analysis of learning in movie consumption, and Buera, Monge-Naranojo
and Primiceris (2010) estimation of learning in macroeconomic policy decisions.
Morretti identies social learning using the idea that movie sales will react to past surprises
based on the di¤erence between ex ante expectations and realized outcomes. This identication
strategy is based on the premise that Bayesian agents will update their beliefs only if signals are
di¤erent from their prior and relies mostly on falsication tests to ensure that the e¤ects are actually
consistent with learning. Buera, Monge-Naranojo and Primiceris (2010) take a di¤erent approach,
and rely on a structural model of learning, whereby information across countries are spatially
correlated, making Bayesian learning o¤ of a neighbors observed policy decision possible. Between
the two approaches, ours is the most similar to Morrettis methodology, in that we attempt to
separate the learning hypothesis from an alternative by conrming that the so-called learning e¤ect
is most pronounced when it should be. Our approach complements Morrettis work, in that our
interpretation relies on the dynamic aspects associated with social learning, such as the trade-o¤
between the option value and opportunity cost of delay, which will result in slow or fast adoption,
depending on the extent of adoption among peers.
There are a few recent studies in political science that share the same setting as us. In the studies
by Lassen and Brown (2010), and Williams and Gulati (2010), they also analyze which politicians
adopt Twitter, based on politician and district characteristics. We however, are more interested in
the relationship between Facebook and Twitter, and whether there exists complementarity between
the two. Furthermore, our main contribution is the identication of peer e¤ects in di¤erent social
networks, which, we later conclude as being generated by social learning or more specically, word-
of-mouth di¤usion. That said, our paper provides a more comprehensive characterization of Twitter
di¤usion. Moreover, our methodology may be applied to other settings for which social media is
being adopted7.
Within the realm of social networks in politics, a recent paper by Cohen and Malloy (2010)
problems.
7For example, Twitter has become an increasingly popular marketing tool for businesses, ranging from Best Buy
to Zipcar. Moreover, a search on Amazon.com reveals at least a handful of business strategy books on how to utilize
Twitter e¤ectively.
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looks at the e¤ect that social networks have on politiciansvoting behavior. They identify alumni
networks that connects politicians to other politicians, politicians to rms, and networks based on
seating arrangement in the Senate. Their identied peer e¤ect can be interpreted as the incentive
to support bills that the social network nds important (but not the individual voter himself), with
the implied expectation of reciprocity in future bills that the individual may want passed. Note that
in our specication of committee networks, the likelihood of social interaction among peers is high,
while in their alumni networks, there is no obvious reason why they would necessarily interact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines some basic information
about social media and its relation to politics, followed by a detailed description of the data. Section
III provides some simple characterizations of who adopts Twitter. Section IV investigates how
peers impact the speed of Twitter adoption by focusing on the sub-sample of adopters. Concluding
remarks are provided in Section V.
2 Background
2.1 Basic idea behind social media
Twitter is a recent micro-blogging craze, among the already saturated market of social media8; by
the end of 2008, there were over 3 million Twitter users (Comm, 2010). The basic idea of Twitter is
that those who have accounts can write short messages (up to 140 characters) that can potentially
be read by thousands (or millions). That said, a Twitter users main objective is often to attract
as many followers as possible, and keeping existing followers interested in their Tweets by posting
compelling content. Unlike its most famous cousins, Facebook and Youtube, users cannot post
pictures or videos on their Twitter feeds; although, they can post links containing this content.
Twitter has outshined traditional blogs because of its ease and simplicity; no longer do bloggers
have to spend countless hours writing online content, when all they need is a few seconds to send a
Twitter post via Short Message Service (SMS)9 (McFedries, 2007). A Twitter user gets the most
benet by also following the content of others, as being a follower of a fellow Twitter user might
generate some reciprocity in followings. That said, some of the most popular Twitter accounts
are those who have many followers but only follow a handful of other accounts. Unlike the more
traditional form of Blogging, Twitter users rely on the technology to market themselves as a quality
brand, as opposed to a low cost way to generate advertising revenue. For example, the GOP Leader
John Boehner has over 25000 followers and was following over 12000 users as of May 28, 2010.
8See Comm (2010) for a complete list and description of available social media outlets.
9See McFedries (2007) for further details.
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Preceding forms of social media include MySpace, Real Simple Syndication (RSS), Flickr, Face-
book and Youtube, launched in 2003, 1999, 2004, 2004 and 2005. MySpace and Facebook are
primarily social networking sites, although Facebook attracts mostly college educated people, while
MySpace is well known for its members belonging to the music and lm industry. Both have been
used as venues for naked self promotion. In fact, it has become common practice for employers to
evaluate job candidates by their social networking sites10. RSS allows Internet users to easily and
e¤ortlessly subscribe to their favorite Blogs, such as New York Times Freakonomics or Financial
Times Undercover Economist. Flickr and Youtube specialize in publishing user generated photos
and videos, respectively. They provide an easy way to share content that would otherwise be hard
to share due to their le sizes. Moreover, with the spread of high speed internet, online photo
albums and video streams are more accessible than ever. Successful and well known users in social
media are known for integrating and combining multiple sources to cross market their brand. Face-
book users can Tweet and share Youtube videos, Youtube users can include links to their MySpace
videos for viewers who want more content and Facebook users can submit their Twitter messages
through a Facebook Application. Finally, Twitter is an e¤ective way of introducing a large audience
to the same users Blog. Drawing on popular culture, Apple super-fan iJustine and video Blogger
Kevjumba have successfully capitalized on multiple social media platforms to promote themselves
at viral levels.
2.1.1 Past research on social media in politics
Although there exists no (political) economy or management literature about Twitter use in politics,
research in this area has become increasingly popular in other elds11. Virtually all of the past
research is concerned with answering the question: "How is Twitter used?" Used as motivation
for our study, Golbeck, Grims and Rogers (2010) analyze the content of Tweets among all U.S.
politicians and nd that 53% of all Twitter content generated by them contains information, which
they dene as statements that contains links, positions on relevant issues, or resources; this nding
contradicts the popular criticism that Twitter is simply an online environment that incubates
hipster narcissism (McFedries, 2007). Some view the information provided by politicians through
social media as being useful in two manners, one in which politicians tell us what they want us
to hear (a.k.a. outreach), and one in which information actually has value and keeps government
10See article Employers Look at Facebook Too. CBC News, June 20, 2006.
11For instance, there is research on the content and conversations within Twitter (Honeycutt and Herring, 2009),
Twitter as word of mouth (Jansen et. al., 2009), and Twitters relationship with social networks (Java et. al., 2007;
Krishnamurthy, Gill, and Arlitt, 2008),
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honest (a.k.a. transparency).
The research on Twitter in politics is nested within existing research about the evolution of
congressional communication over time12. Their conclusions overwhelmingly point to the impor-
tance of the Internet and communication. To summarize, the Internet has improved interactions
between politicians and voters, and as a consequence, those who embrace the technology have seen
much success; with better communication, comes better mobilization of voters who support for a
representatives agenda.
Social media in general has played an increasingly large role in politics around the world,
especially so after the Franking Commission13 permitted unrestricted use of social media in congress.
For example, Williams and Gulati (2009) nd that the percentage of active Facebook users among
candidates in the 2006 and 2008 elections increased from 17.8 to 69.9 percent. Other authors have
found that internet communications and social media matter in politics (Gibson et al, 2003; and
Smith and Rainie, 2008). Our paper takes as given that social media is relevant. During the 2008
Presidential race, Barack Obama devoted nearly 100 sta¤ just to maintain his image on social
media outlets14. Twitter also has the power of organizing large movements, such as the response of
Mir-Hossein Mousavis supporters to Irans disputed and controversial election outcome in 200915.
Social media has proved to be among the most important PR tools in modern politics, and continues
to do so. Perhaps the most tting quote to describe Twitter adoption in politics is by Ivor Tassell
of the Globe and Mail (September 4, 2008)16: "Like rats scurrying up the ropes before an ocean
liner departs, politicians have sharp noses for knowing when to hop aboard a trend."
2.2 Data
Our cross-sectional sample of observations consists of all active congressmen and women of the
111th House of Representatives. To obtain detailed information about each representative, we
use a combination of the information provided on their own personal websites, the Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress, as well as Wikipedia. Using these sources of information,
we can nd out how long each representative has been in o¢ ce, the state and district he/she
represents, how old they are, their gender, race, religion, education and previous occupation before
serving the public. We augment this information with data from the 2000 U.S. Census for the
districts that they represent, such as the population, median income and race distribution of their
12To name a few, refer to Gulati (2004), Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) and Oleszek (2007).
13Body of government that regulates Congressional Mass communication.
14See the article Sweet to Tweet. The Economist, May 8, 2010.
15See the article Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement. Time Magazine, June 17, 2009.
16The authors rst discovered this quote on the blog on Twitter analysis, http://blog.mastermaq.ca/.
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corresponding districts.
Other important information in our data is each representatives use of social media, such as
MySpace, RSS, Flickr, Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter. Representatives often have a section on
their homepage that contains icons that link their personal website to corresponding media sites.
With the exception of Twitter, we try to avoid using Internet searches for the representatives social
media portals, as there is no guarantee that those sites are actually endorsed by the representative.
Twitter, on the other hand, has a verication system that ensures identity authenticity. For each
representative who uses Twitter, we extract the date in which their rst public message was posted.
This exact date provides us a valid proxy as to the time in which the representative adopted Twitter,
as an active Twitter user is almost surely one that Tweets. Unlike Facebook, there is no value in
being a passive user.
For each representative, we also observe which committees he/she belongs to. Representatives
reveal which committees they would like to become members of, which is followed by a formal vote
by the House. A representatives underlying interests and experience are major determinants as
to which committees he/she will end up in. Moreover, each committee is chaired by a Democrat,
and consists of disproportionately more Democrats than Republicans, so as to reect the current
proportion of Democrats in the House of Representatives. In our data, there are a total of 23
committees, each with a specic mandate and jurisdiction, that a representative can potentially
be a member of17. On average, representatives belong to about 2 committees. The maximum
number of committees representatives in our sample belong to is 4. Committee information will be
important in the last section, as we attempt to establish relevant social networks between politicians.
A histogram shows that the distribution for the number of committees is centered at the mean.
Moreover, the distribution seems to be invariant to whether the politician is a Twitter user or not.
All of the information about Twitter adoption was collected on May 24, 2010. There is very
little entry into the Twitter platform in 2010, which is suggestive that the di¤usion of Twitter was
stabilized by the time data was collected18.
2.3 Major events and Twitter adoption
To analyze the distribution of Twitter adoption around important economic and political events,
we calculate the number of days between an adopters rst Tweet, and the event. Negative values
imply days before the event, while positive values imply days after the event. We then graph the
17Note however that our data falls short of identifying the subcommittees that each representative belongs to.
18However, the authors will keep a careful eye on Twitter adoption around the upcoming congressional election in
2010.
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distribution of these values. We focus our attention on ve well publicized events:
1. Barack Obamas rst Twitter post on April 29, 2007.
2. The nancial bail-out on October 3, 2008.
3. The 2008 Election on November 4, 2008.
4. Barack Obamas inauguration on January 20, 2009.
5. Health care vote on March 22, 2010.
The rst histogram looks at the di¤usion of Twitter after Barack Obamas rst Tweet. All but
one of the representatives in our sample adopted Twitter after Barack Obama made the rst leap. In
fact, a large proportion of them followed suit well after Obamas rst Tweet. This di¤usion pattern
has characteristics of social learning, in that adoption is slow initially since potential users are
delaying entry so as to exploit informational externalities that those preceding them may provide.
Surprisingly, there is not much Twitter adoption prior to the 2008 Election. We expected there
to be a large number of representatives adopting the technology for their campaigning e¤orts, as
Barack Obama did. Instead, much of the adoption is concentrated after the election. In fact, much
of the entry into Twitter technology is centered around Barack Obamas presidential inauguration
ceremony. When we look at the distribution of entry into Twitter over time across parties, we see
that this pattern is not exclusive to the Democratic party. In fact, it would appear as though a
greater concentration of Republican Twitter adoption is centered around this date. We suspect that
politicians may be induced to participate in Twitter around this time to write a short message either
congratulating the new President, or provide commentary about the President and his policies.
An alternative interpretation of this observed phenomenon is that the time of inauguration also
corresponds to the time that new representatives assume o¢ ce. Therefore, this clustering should
only happen for new representatives as incumbents entered o¢ ce well before January 20, 2009.
However, when we look at the distribution of entry into Twitter by newcomers and incumbent
separately, the two types of representatives share very similar distributional patterns.
3 Characterizing Twitter adoption
This section is meant to characterize the representatives who choose to use Twitter. As no previous
study in economics or management has done so, we feel it is meaningful to conduct this exploratory
analysis. The analysis is motivated by the question as to the complementarity between Facebook
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and Twitter. With the integration of Twitter applications (i.e. "Apps") in Facebook, we would
expect there to be some complementarity between these two sources of social media. Our analysis
conrms that indeed this conjecture is true. Moreover, the complementarity seems to be felt
uniformly across representatives of di¤erent age, party a¢ liation and tenure.
3.1 Identication strategy
We use the full sample of representatives to conduct this analysis. What we are interested in is
the propensity to Tweet, conditional on a number of representative specic variables The analysis
is carried out using a simple Probit model where the adoption of Twitter is represented by a 0/1
dummy variable. A number of co-variates are included to control for representative specic het-
erogeneity. The independent variables fall under three main categories. First, we have information
about the representative, such as gender, race, age, tenure, party, religion, education and previous
occupation. We control for religion, education and previous occupation by representing them using
categorical variables; consequently, there is no clear interpretation for the coe¢ cients associated
with these three variables. The second set of variables are regarding information about the repre-
sentatives constituents, such as the districts population, income and demographics. Finally, the
third set of variables characterize the representatives usage of older social media, such as MySpace,
RSS, Flickr, Facebook and Youtube. It is these set of alternatives that we are most interested in,
as they will allow us to establish complementarity between Twitter and other media.
One important qualication for incorporating the usage of other social media as independent
variables is that their adoption decision was made before the decision to adopt Twitter. Although
Facebook does not publicly make available the date in which each politician rst became members,
for nearly all Twitter adopters, there is evidence that Facebook was an important campaigning
tool as early as the 2006 congressional elections (Williams and Gulati, 2009). Another important
identication assumption is that all Twitter adopters who also use Facebook adopted Facebook at
a time when they did not anticipate the launch of Twitter (two years later). This way, we rule out
inter-temporal correlation of unobserved heterogeneity among forward looking politicians. Relax-
ing these assumptions is left for future work once better data about Facebook di¤usion becomes
available19.
19The challenge with obtaining accurate Facebook di¤usion data is that the dates in which representatives became
members are not readily available due to privacy concerns. Moreover, it was only recently that Facebook users were
able to post public status updates on their wall in the same spirit as Twitter. In general, getting good information
about Facebook usage will be hit or miss, depending on how strict a representatives privacy settings are set.
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3.2 Main results
Politicians that represent populated districts are more likely to adopt Twitter, as the impact of
having Twitter as a marketing tool is signicant if their audience is large and captive. One inter-
esting (and surprising) result is that Democrats are less likely to adopt Twitter, despite Barack
Obama being an avid cheerleader for social media and transparent government. It is possible that
Republicans view the adoption decision as one of strategy. Much like vertical competition between
rival rms, Republicans may feel pressure to compete with Democrats in the arena of perceived
openness.
We conrm that representatives view Twitter as a complement to Facebook. Facebook status
has a positive and signicant impact on the propensity to use Twitter. Although the other social
media have positive e¤ects on Twitter use, they are not quite as signicant, which makes sense
as Facebook has made the strongest e¤ort to establish compatibility between the two. Alterna-
tively, Facebook might be an indicator of the constituentscomfort with online communities. We
cannot denitively rule out this alternative explanation, however, browsing through the Twitter
pages conrm our intuition, as a number of representatives post Twitter messages using Facebook,
while advertising their Facebook pages on their Twitter page; representatives are certainly taking
advantage of these explicit synergies.
3.2.1 Does the complementary Facebook e¤ect apply to all representatives?
We are interested in determining whether certain types of representatives are more likely to take
advantage of the synergies that exist between Facebook and Twitter. For instance, if a representa-
tive already has a Facebook account, posting Twitter feeds can be done easily within the Facebook
account; thereby saving the representative some time and e¤ort.
The data tells us that there is no discernible pattern with respect to Twitter adoption and
Facebook use interacted with age, tenure or party a¢ liation. From the estimated coe¢ cients, one
may conjecture that the marginal e¤ects of these interacted terms are close to zero and/or sta-
tistically insignicant. Implementing the Ai and Norton (2003) technique for calculating marginal
e¤ects, we verify this conjecture. The marginal e¤ects for Facebook interacted with age, tenure and
party a¢ liation generate z-statistics of 0.12, 0.83, and 1.23 and magnitudes of 0.00079, 0.0054, and
0.079 respectively. Therefore, the Facebook complementarity does not apply to a specic subset of
politicians, but instead, applies quite generally to all.
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3.2.2 Is Twitter being used to generate new support or maintain existing support?
In the political science literature, it has been argued that social media is an important technological
campaign innovation. We wish to look deeper and establish whether representatives use Twitter
as a means to generate new constituent support, or maintain support from existing constituents.
Intuitively, Twitter can facilitate both objectives, in that it can help representatives advertise their
political platform to (potentially) large audiences in concise and sharp messages, or keep their
existing supporters posted with recent activities, bills, and thoughts. This question is not answered
directly, but we can infer the answer based on whether representatives are more or less likely
to adopt when they won the 2008 congressional districts by large margins. The existing data is
augmented by each representatives 2008 vote percentage. After including this new variable to the
original Probit model, we nd that the percentage of 2008 votes for a representative is positively and
signicantly associated with the propensity to adopt Twitter among representatives who adopted
Twitter after the election; this e¤ect is small and insignicant for those who adopted Twitter before
the election, as one would expect. This result suggests that the incentive to adopt is tied to the
existing support from voters, and that campaign considerations are actually not that important.
4 Characterizing the speed of Twitter adoption
For this part of our analysis, we focus on the sub-sample of politicians who adopted Twitter by
the time of data collection. We are particularly interested in studying the speed of adoption and
the role that peer e¤ects play. Do peer e¤ects speed up or slow down the adoption process? As
the descriptive section showed, there is quite a lot of variation in when adopters adopted. Much of
this variation can indeed be explained by variation in peer adoption. To establish this result, the
next sections provide a simple identication strategy, followed by the key results. In the end, we
nd that peer e¤ects matter, and these e¤ects are consistent with those that would be generated
by social learning.
4.1 Identication strategy
The data allows us to identify the exact date of each Twitter adopters rst Tweet. Therefore,
we can identify how long it takes an adopter to adopt, as well as who adopted Twitter before
him or her. We consider two possible social networks for which peer e¤ects can di¤use through.
The rst one is the network of representatives within the same state, which we call the state
network. Presumably, representatives within the same state will most likely care about similar
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issues and therefore, more likely to interact with one another. Our second denition is the network
of representatives that belong to the same committees, which we call the committee network. Using
these two social networks, we can dene the Committee_peersi as the number of peers that already
adopted Twitter before representative i within his/her committee network, and State_peersi as
the number of peers that already adopted Twitter before i in his/her state network.
With these constructed variables, we can run the following regression20
Days_to_adopti = +   Committee_peersi +   State_peersi +  Xi + "i
where Days_to_adopti is the number of days past since the most recent adoption of Twitter
by some other representative j 6= i21. For example, if representative A adopted on January 1,
2009, representative B on January 10, 2009, and representative C on January 31, 2009, we set the
dependent variable for B and C to be 9 and 21 respectively. Consequently, the dependent variable
is undened for the very rst Twitter adopter, as he was preceded by no other Twitter adopting
representative. It is assumed that each representative is aware of all those who has already adopted
before him/her, since politicians who adopt Twitter are publicly identied through Internet searches
or http://tweetcongress.org. How soon a representative adopts relative to the most recent adopter is
conjectured to depend on the peers around him/her as well as exogenous district and representative
specic characteristics, Xi. The vector Xi consists of the same independent variables as in the
earlier analysis about Twitter adoption, such as information about the representative, his/her
propensity to adopt other social media, as well as information about the represented constituents.
We maintain the earlier identication assumption that the decision to use MySpace, RSS, Flickr,
Facebook and/or Youtube were made well before deciding to add Twitter.
We include the two peer denitions in the same regression as the peers from both groups are
unlikely to coincide, as committee members tend to be quite diversied. A simple scatter-plot
shows that there is no clear pattern between the two variables. Having both in the regression when
we are trying to understand and explain the results. There more variation in Committee_peersi
than State_peersi largely because each representative belongs to a di¤erent number and set of
committees that themselves are quite diverse. For instance, Committee_peersi can be as much
as 62, while State_peersi is at most 21 in our sample. Representatives who do not belong to any
20An alternative specication using a proportional hazard model was also used. Results are qualitatively the same,
and therefore, omitted in this version.
21An earlier draft of this paper used the number of days past Barrack Obamas rst Twitter post. There were
many issues with this measure, such as the fact that the relationship between the number of peers and the dependent
variable was trivially dened.
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committees will have Committee_peersi = 0.
Although representatives often state their preferences for which committees to belong to, whether
or not their requests are actually honored depends largely on their qualications and constituents
interests. Ultimately, our committee network is valid provided that committees are not formed ex
ante with social media considerations. The state network is even less likely to be endogenously
determined, as candidates often choose to represent districts they already live in22.
As in most studies about peer e¤ects, there is a potential identication problem associated
with simultaneity (reection problem); that is, if say two representatives make the decision to on
how soon to adopt Twitter, the peer e¤ect on when to adopt will be biased as the timing decision
will be a non-linear function of both representativesunobserved heterogeneity. We overcome this
challenge by using the fact that the number of peers associated with i is based on the number
before i adopted. Therefore, at the time that i decided to adopt at Days_to_adopti, his/her peers
have already made their decisions in the past periods. As such, we can treat the two denitions
of is peers as being is observed state variable (that will not subsequently be a¤ected by his/her
decision).
Even though simultaneity is unlikely to be an issue, we still need to ensure that the "endogenous"
peer e¤ect23 based on past adoption within a network is not confounded by other factors within a
network, such as exogenous characteristics within a network (exogenous peer e¤ects), deterministic
behavior within a network (correlated e¤ects), the size of the network and unobserved heterogeneity.
4.2 Main results
The key takeaway from these estimates is that the peer e¤ects within a committee network matter.
They have a negative e¤ect on the days to adopt, which means that a representative whos number
of peers in his/her committees by one standard deviation will adopt Twitter 3 days sooner. In fact,
this result is robust to specications that contain exogenous information about the committee, such
as the number of peers who are democrats, and committee dummies (over 20 of them). We also
verify that the peer e¤ects are robust to the size of the social network as well as the month-year time
of adoption24. When the regressions are repeated using the percentage of adopting peers within a
network, we nd that a standard deviation change in the percentage of observed peer adopters in
22For example, a quick overview of our data reveals correlation between the city where a representatives most
recent degree was earned, and the region that he/she overlooks.
23We are using the same terminology as Manski (1993). Note however, our data structure avoids the reection
problem, hence, endogeneity is encapsulated by quotations.
24We dene this using time dummies for each month-year. This way, we can get multiple observations for each
time specic control.
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a committee network accelerates the adoption of Twitter by 3 days as well.
To some extent, these estimates hold their own against the standard Manski critique. As politi-
cians rarely change their party loyalties, which are formed well before they enter o¢ ce, we expect
the number of Democrats within a given network as a good source of exogenous variation across
state and committee a¢ liations. Moreover, there should be no correlation between a represen-
tatives unobserved preference for Twitter and his/her peersparty loyalties. Although we have
a number of other exogenous variables to choose from, we choose peersparty a¢ liation as it is
an signicant and important determinant of both the propensity, and speed of Twitter adoption.
An alternative source of variation is the number of Facebook users among peers. We believe this
measure though is not appropriate, as it might be correlated with unobserved determinants of
Twitter adoption speed through positive spillover carried through network e¤ects within Facebook
and synergies between Facebook and Twitter.
From our estimates, we see that an increase in the number of Democratic peers within the same
social networks speeds up the Twitter di¤usion process. This result itself is interesting, since the
dummy variable for whether an individual is Democratic or not has the tendency to delay entry
into Twitter technology. We suspect that much of this e¤ect is driven by the Republicansdesire
to match the general transparent government ideology propagated by the Democratic party.
There are also concerns of correlated peer e¤ects, in that members in the same social networks
behave some deterministic manner. However, the peer e¤ect from committee networks is robust to
the specication that contains committee specic dummy variables.
Note however that peer e¤ects are not as strong in state networks, as their estimates are quite
noisy; this null result suggests that social interactions are more prevalent in committee networks,
rather than state networks.
Descriptive analysis revealed that Twitter adoption was clustered around the time that Barack
Obama was sworn into o¢ ce, on January 20, 2009. We want to avoid the possibility that the peer
e¤ect is articially generated by representatives who adopted Twitter simply to lend their support
to the new President, not because of some learning mechanism. To overcome this identication
challenge, we repeat the same regressions as above, except by omitting observations for which
Twitter was adopted within 25, 50 and 100 days before/after the day of inauguration. This way,
our sample is most likely representative of a population of Twitter adopting politicians who were
not inuenced by the historically signicant event.
The peer e¤ect for both remains signicant and important as we delete more and more observa-
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tions of Twitter adoption centered around the inauguration date. In fact, the peer e¤ect becomes
more signicant with the omission of observations for the denition based on common committee
membership; ultimately, our peer e¤ect associated with the social networks formed by committees
is robust to the Obama e¤ect.
When peers are identied as being Democratic or Republican, the adoption speed is much
faster for those in committee networks with a large number of Republican adopters, rather than
Democratic adopters. It appears as though the representatives are more likely to conform with
Republican Twitter users, and di¤erentiate themselves with Democratic Twitter users.
Population speeds up the adoption of Twitter, while income slows down the adoption of Twit-
ter25. Being a female African-American representative in a predominantly black district speeds up
the adoption rate. Those who earned their most recent degrees from an Ivy League school will also
adopt Twitter sooner. A surprising result that complements our analysis of Twitter adoption is
that among adopters, Democrats tend to adopt Twitter at a slower rate; despite the partys general
ideology of more open and transparent government. Older politicians adopt Twitter sooner, but
not experienced politicians. Finally, as one would expect, Facebook and Youtubes complementary
e¤ects also materialize in faster adoption.
4.2.1 Social learning and the speed of adoption
The previous section demonstrated that the speed of adoption actually accelerates with the number
of past adopters in the same committees. This result can be rationalized by social learning regarding
Twitters merits. Adopting Twitter carries a lot of uncertainty, as the merits of it as a marketing tool
are still yet to be fully discovered. Some constituents might welcome the perceived openness that
Twitter o¤ers, while others might simply view Twitter as a venue for narcissism and undesirable
advertising. Because Twitter is a fairly new, politicians are unlikely to know the proportion of
constituents who will react positively to their decision to adopt Twitter. However, this uncertainty
can be mitigated through social interactions, whether they be with fellow committee members or
politicians representing neighboring districts. Via word-of-mouth, a representative can continually
update his or her belief about Twitters merit by communicating through social interactions with
those who have already adopted the technology.
An alternative explanation is the existence of network e¤ects in Twitter. Part of Twitters
appeal is the ability to have (public) conversations with fellow users. Therefore, the value of the
25This result initially seems odd as there is evidence that Internet adoption is more prevelant among wealthier
Americans. However, Internet use decreases with income. See Goldfarb and Prince (2008) for further details.
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Twitter communication platform increases as the online community grows. This means that a
representative may wish to adopt sooner if it observes a large number of peers who have adopted,
so as to exploit the network benets of Twitter.
We attempt to disentangle these two explanations by stating two predictions, which are jointly
unique to learning.
1. Learning is important to representatives with no prior experience with a similar social media
outlet, such as Facebook.
2. Learning is important to representatives who are more well connected, such as those who
have a long tenure in the House of Representatives.
Because Facebook shares a number of similarities with Twitter, such as the ability to post short
public feeds, a Facebook user should already some information about how e¤ective Twitter could
be as a marketing tool. So our estimates are consistent with learning if those who already have
Facebook have little to no reaction to what their peers are doing; conversely, those who have not
adopted Facebook should react the most to what their peers are doing. Social learning theory should
in fact generate an opposite prediction to one generated by network e¤ects, given that Facebook
and Twitter are shown to be complements in the rst set of results; Facebook users should see
a greater benet of adopting Twitter when a large number of peers have already adopted, as the
complementary technology will allow them to pool the network e¤ects of Twitter into Facebook, and
vice versa. That said, one simple way to test for this hypothesis is to run the following regression26
Days_to_adopti = +   Committee_peersi +   State_peersi
+  Committee_peersi No_Facebooki +   State_peersi No_Facebooki
+ Xi + "i
and test whether  < 0. First, this regression produces an F-statistic of 5.36 for the hypothesis
 +  = 0, which is rejected at 5% signicance. Most importantly, ^ is negative and signicant at
a 10% level (for the hypothesis that ^ < 0). There is certainly evidence that the adoption of peers
matters more to those who have not used Facebook before, in that the peer e¤ect leads to an even
faster adoption of Twitter for those unfamiliar with Facebook.
26We only focus on the interactions with the committee peer e¤ects as the state peer e¤ects are shown, despite
being of the correct sign, to be statistically insignicant.
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Social learning regarding non-essential issue like Twitter should require face-to-face commu-
nications between representatives27. The probability of interacting with others in person should
increase as for those who are more connected. Presumably, those who have been in o¢ ce the longest
should have had the most opportunity to develop these necessary social connections. To test this
hypothesis, we use
Days_to_adopti = +   Committee_peersi +   State_peersi
+  Committee_peersi  Tenurei +   State_peersi  Tenurei
+ Xi + "i
and test the hypothesis  < 0. The joint hypothesis  +  = 0 is not as strong as the rst test
with an F-statistic of 2.4, but is still signicant at a 15% level. Also note that ^ is negative, but
not signicant. We take this as weak evidence against the alternative that  > 0. Here, the peer
e¤ect leads to faster adoption of Twitter among those with long tenured careers in the House of
Representatives.
In summary, these test results collectively support the social learning story. The peer e¤ect is
most pronounced in cases for which social learning matters, such as cases in which a representative
has little experience with social media and/or is most likely to be well-connected.
4.2.2 The role of unobserved heterogeneity
While we can control for committee or state specic e¤ects, controlling for individual level het-
erogeneity is virtually impossible with the data on hand. Unobserved heterogeneity could lead to
estimates that overstate the importance of peer e¤ects, when in reality, Twitter adoption is instead
driven by underlying preferences or knowledge about constituent support for Twitter that as ob-
servers, we are unaware about. We can, however, demonstrate that there are no patterns between
the speed of adoption and some proxy for an unobserved preference or information Twitter. To
resolve our concerns, we rst outline two main sources of unobserved heterogeneity:
1. A representative may have strong or weak preference towards Twitter, that cannot be cap-
tured by observed variation.
2. A representative may have knowledge about the social impact they could have on Twitter,
that cannot be captured by observed variation.
27 It seems unlikely that a representative will make a long distance call to another representative to inquire about
Twitter.
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To nd a proxy for these sources of unobserved heterogeneity, we extract more data from each
representatives Twitter page on May 31, 2010. From their pages, we are able to observe usage
and social impact statistics, such as the total number of Tweets, the number of other users the
representatives are following, and the number of other users who are following the representatives.
The rst two are statistics generated by levels of activity, in that a representative has to choose to
Tweet and choose to follow. Those that are more active, must be so because they receive utility
from Twitter. Alternatively, representatives who choose to adopt Twitter may do so because they
ex ante anticipate receiving strong support and enthusiasm from their constituents. So assuming
that their predictions are accurate, the number of followers might proxy for this knowledge, as
researchers, we are naive about.
By adding this information to our data, we can calculate the number of Tweets, followings
and followers per day for each representative. For example, to calculate the number of Tweets per
day, we calculate the total number of days as an active Twitter user to be the number of days
between their rst Tweet and the day we collected this new data. This value provides us a good
approximation as to the level of activity per day, as representatives typically post the same number
of Tweets per day. Similar constructions are used for the number of followers and following per
day.
The day of entry into Twitter has economically small e¤ect on the ex post levels of Tweets,
following, or followers. A one standard deviation change in the days to adoption leads to an in-
signicant drop in Tweets by 0.004, increase in followers and followings by 0.2 and 0.08 respectively.
Considering that the average number of Tweets, followers and followings are 146, 2618 and 408,
there is no meaningful relation between these ex post proxies for unobserved heterogeneity and the
speed of adoption.
5 The opportunity cost of Twitter use
Our proxies for unobserved heterogeneity are shown to have little relation to the speed of adoption.
This result indicates that adoption is likely driven by costs, rather than benets. We wish to verify
this claim in the nal section. While setting up an account on Twitter is free, participating is not,
as there is an opportunity cost associated with usage. Time that they spend on Twitter could have
been spent on (perhaps) more worthwhile endeavors. Our analysis mirrors that of Goldfarb and
Prince (2008), who try to answer why internet adoption and usage di¤ers.
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5.1 Identication strategy
We interpret the adoption and ex post usage decisions as a two-step process. In the rst step,
a representative decides whether to open up a Twitter account. Once a Twitter member, the
representative must then choose how much to Tweet. A representative has only a nite amount
of time each day, so Twitter use will (presumably) come out of time spent on the internet, which,
decreases the amount of time that can be spent doing more productive activities. One may think
of each representative who adopts as solving the following utility maximization problem following
adoption
max
T; T ;I
U2(T; T ; I)
subject to the following time and budget constraints
T + T  I
I + I  L
pI +M  w(H   L)
where T is the amount of time spent on Twitter, T is the amount of time spent on other internet
activities, I is the amount of leisure time spent on the internet, I is the amount of leisure time
not spent on the internet, L is the total amount of leisure time, p is the price of internet, M is for
other expenditures, and H is the total amount of hours awake. We assume that internet activities
in general provide utility to representatives; consequently, U2 is increasing in all of its arguments.
The optimization problem above may be re-written as
max
T
U2(T; I   T; I)
where I = ww p(
M
w  H   I). Notice that a su¢ cient condition for @I@w =   p(w p)2 (Mw  H   I) 
M
w(w p) < 0 to hold exists. That is, the amount of internet use will decrease with a representatives
opportunity cost. Because Twitter use increases with internet use, a representatives opportunity
cost should also decrease the amount of Twitter activity. Also, the amount of time spent on non-
Twitter activities, will decrease the amount of time spent on Twitter. Let T  be the optimal level
of Twitter use. A representative will adopt provided that
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U1(0; I; I)  U1(T ; I   T ; I)
This relationship can be translated into a Tobit regression, such that representative i adopts if
and only if
U1(T

i ; Ii   T i ; Ii)  U1(0; Ii; Ii) = +  Z1i +   wi + &  Ti + "1i  0
where Z1i is a vector of variables that may a¤ect the adoption decision. Because we only
observe the Twitter use of Twitter adopters, the sample used is selected. To correct for this sample
selection bias, we estimate the following second-stage regression with a Heckman correction term
T i (Z1i; Ii) = +  Z1i +   wi + &  Ti +  
^i
i
+ "2i
where ^ii is the Mills ratio from our rst-stage adoption Probit estimates
28 and Zi contains
variables that would a¤ect the amount of time a representative has to Tweet. For our analysis, we
let proxy for T i (Z1i; Ii) using the number of Tweets per day, wi using the number of bills that a
representative has sponsored during the 111th session, and Ti using indicators for whether other
social media are used. The number of sponsored bills serves as a good proxy for opportunity cost for
the following reason: representatives are may not be re-elected if a large number of their initiatives
receive enough votes, thus, time not spent convincing their peers to vote in favor of their initiatives
entails a potential monetary loss associated with losing their seat in o¢ ce.
5.2 Main results
Representatives who have sponsored a large number of bills are lighter users of Twitter than those
who have sponsored a fewer number. While the number of bills is not a perfect proxy for a
representatives opportunity cost, this result is consistent with the models prediction that the
opportunity cost of leisure constrains the amount of Twitter usage. Another constraint to Twitter
usage is the adoption of Facebook. Although Facebook and Twitter o¤er some synergies, they
ultimately compete for users leisure time. We see that the other social media have less of an
impact on Twitter use, most likely because they share fewer redundancies.
Interestingly, the number of bills as well as Facebook adoption have an opposite e¤ect on a
representatives propensity to adopt. A representative who has pushed through a large number
of bills is an active member of congress, and those who are more active may participate in a
28Refer to our characterization of Twitter adoption.
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large number of marketing activities as well, such as Twitter. However, they will only be able to
participate in Twitter on a supercial level in order to ensure that their bills pass. The positive
e¤ect of Facebook on adoption is consistent with our earlier characterization of Twitter adoption.
The adoption of peers has a negative (but insignicant) e¤ect on the amount of Twitter usage.
This result provides further evidence against the network e¤ects explanation of the peer e¤ect,
provided as an alternative to social learning. Network e¤ects should encourage the use of Twitter,
not discourage. On the other hand, this result can still be rationalized using the social learning
paradigm; as representatives have a greater pool of knowledge will be more e¢ cient at using Twitter,
thereby reducing the number of Tweets per day.
6 Discussion
6.1 Summary
In this paper, we o¤er new insight into Twitter use in politics. Our analysis goes beyond the status
quo by attempting to explain in detail, the di¤usion process of Twitter. Using detailed data on
each active politician in the 111th House of Representatives, we are able to characterize those who
adopt Twitter, and among those who adopt, which ones adopt sooner.
Facebook plays an important role in Twitter adoption, as it has positive externalities for Twitter
use. Therefore, one may view Facebook not as a substitute to Twitter, but instead, a complement.
We also nd that despite the Democratic platform of transparent government, Democrats are less
likely to adopt Twitter than Republicans. This might either reect the Republicansdesire to make
themselves comparable to the ruling party.
Looking at Twitter users exclusively, we nd that users have less incentive to delay adoption if
a large number of their peers have already adopted, where we dene peers based on two denitions
of a social network between politicians: the rst being a network between representatives belong-
ing to the same committees, and the second being a network between representatives of di¤erent
districts within the same state. As a robustness check, we verify that the peer e¤ects hold even
when exogenous network characteristics and correlated e¤ects are controlled for. To explain our
ndings, we provide some evidence in favor of social learning, since the peer e¤ect is strongest when
representatives have had no experienced with Facebook and/or when representatives have been in
o¢ ce long enough to develop their state network. To address our concerns that our ndings might
be articially generated by those who adopted Twitter simply because of some important event,
like Barack Obamas inauguration, we redo the estimations using sub-samples that discard rep-
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resentatives who began using Twitter around the time of January 20, 2009. The peer e¤ects do
not disappear, but instead, become larger in magnitude (while maintaining signicance) after our
sub-sample adjustments. Finally, we show using ex post Twitter usage statistics, that unobserved
heterogeneity is unlikely to drive our results.
The last section shows that the intensity to which a representative Tweets is constrained by the
number of sponsored bills, as well as whether or not that representative is also a Facebook user.
These ndings are consistent with the conjecture that Twitter use is not free of opportunity cost.
Social learning is becoming an increasingly important area of research in empirical microeco-
nomics. Moreover, as politicians from other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom29
are also beginning to adopt Twitter, the topic on social media and politics has never been more
relevant. Motivated by trends in both popular culture and academia, our research provides a better
understanding about how communication technology actually di¤uses, representative to representa-
tive, which is made possible by our detailed information about each representatives precise time of
adoption. This paper lls the void in research on Twitter and politics by establishing the incentives
behind the adoption decision, while this paper serves as a simple example of how the concept of
delay can be identied using data. The next section illustrates that this paper should motivate
subsequent economics research about social media and politics.
6.2 Future research agenda
Although the paper has helped us understand the di¤usion mechanism for Twitter, much is still
unknown about the real impact of Twitter and social media. The danger of decentralizing media is
that information may no longer be as reliable. With the abundance of Internet content, the time it
takes to evaluate all this content may drain society of its productivity. Does the promise of (short
term) attention actually provide enough incentive for Twitter personalities to publish Tweets that
are informative and helpful to followers? Finding out about mundane details of a politicians daily
chores may simply be a waste of time for readers. Furthermore, the politicians may discover over
time that Twitters value has been overrated. To move research about Twitter into a normative
direction, we discuss three possible extensions to our current paper.
6.2.1 Competition through Twitter adoption
Given that Twitter is widely thought of as a marketing instrument, it is natural to ask whether this
medium can be used strategically by representatives (and candidates). We believe competition can
29High ranking politicians from both countries are known to use Twitter as well.
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emerge through two channels. The rst is through vertical di¤erentiation. If Twitter is associated
with transparent government, then politicians who use Twitter may be deemed as being open,
which we stipulate is good. Secondly, Twitter may be used in a similar manner as combative
advertising. One does not have to look to hard to nd Twitter posts that are critical of policies
associated with rival candidates and/or parties.
6.2.2 Financial impact of Twitter adoption
Financial markets are hungry for whatever information they can nd. A combination of unin-
hibited30 Twitter posts paired with technological advances in Twitter statistical analysis, future
research in the near term should be able to identify whether Twitter can help provide information
to investors. For example, are Twitter posts of those belonging to the Financial Services Commit-
tee informative? More specically, can their Twitter posts predict future policies that a¤ect the
nancial industry. We can further generalize this idea to Twitter posts of rms and whether they
a¤ect abnormal returns.
6.2.3 Longevity of Twitter adoption
There is no guarantee that social learning can actually lead to more accurate information regarding
merits of Twitter, as people in general can always learn the "wrong" state of the world31. The
politicians, however, can learn correctly ex post whether Twitter is actually a useful communications
technology. This means that one can collect data on the exit from Twitter to identify whether
politicians (felt) they made the right decision about Twitter or not. We believe that ex post data
on how long Twitter adopters stay with Twitter will be informative in this respect.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Non-algebraic intuition behind prediction
We turn to Chamley and Gales (1994) model to justify why it an increase in the number of peer
adopters can accelerate own adoption. In their model of investment delay, there are a nite number
of agents who must decide when to adopt. Their timing decisions are based on threshold conditions
on the beliefs about the investment; in our case, the belief would be some posterior probability about
whether Twitter adoption is good. Adopting in the current period will yield a perceived benet,
based on the most updated beliefs net some adoption cost. Beliefs are updated in a Bayesian
manner, and depend on the past investment decisions of others. Alternatively, waiting until the
next period will give an agent some option value associated with delay, which is essentially the
value associated with "reversing a decision" upon conditioning on the subsequent periods updated
information.
The trade-o¤ between the option value and opportunity cost of delay creates an arbitrage
condition for which equilibrium is based on. Adoption will thus be dened by the equilibrium
belief thresholds balance this trade-o¤. In their model, both the option value and opportunity
cost depend on the equilibrium beliefs; however, only the option value depends on the number of
potential adopters who have yet to adopt. This means that as more peers within a social network (of
xed size) adopt, the number of potential adopters to draw information from in the future decreases
commensurately. Therefore, the option value decreases as adoption among peers increases, all else
held xed. For the arbitrage condition to hold, the equilibrium beliefs must be adjusted so as to
reduce the opportunity cost of delay (i.e. benet of adoption). Clearly, the benet of adoption
increases with a representatives belief regarding its merit; that said, the opportunity cost of delay
has to be adjusted downward by reducing the equilibrium beliefs. But since the equilibrium beliefs
correspond to the threshold condition, the probability of forming a new belief that exceeds this
threshold will increase, ultimately, increasing the likelihood of adoption.
With respect to our data, this means that conditional on everything else, politicians should
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adopt Twitter sooner if a large number of peers have already done so.
7.2 Detailed data description
A list of the variables and short descriptions for each are provided below:
1. The variables log(Population), log(Income) and the percentage of black residents are based
on the population numbers from the 2000 U.S. Census (as this study was conducted before
the 2010 Census).
2. Personal information about each candidate, such as gender, race, education, age, tenure,
party a¢ liation, profession and religion were collected using a combination of the directory of
representatives, their personal websites, and Wikipedia. Information common to all sources
were cross referenced with one another to ensure that the accuracy of our information was not
dependent on the source. The information about education and past occupation are based
on the representatives most recent degree and professions. We categorize education and pro-
fession using two dummy variables, a dummy that indicates whether the representative went
to an Ivy League school, and another dummy that indicates whether the representative was
an attorney, judge or lawyer. Furthermore, we categorize religion using a dummy indicating
whether a candidate is Catholic or not. A representatives tenure is based on the number of
years he/she has been in o¢ ce as a representative in the House of Representatives. We do
not count past experience in state level politics towards our measure of tenure.
3. MySpace, RSS, Flickr, Facebook, and/or Youtube use are indicated on each representatives
personal homepage. Because of the amount of identity theft in social media, we do not
indicate that a representative adopted a particular technology, unless it is explicitly stated on
their website; even if an Internet search produces a Facebook link to that representative. On
the other hand, we are able to use both the representatives endorsement within a homepage
as well as Internet searches to identify Twitter use because of Twitters "veried" feature,
which ensures that the online persona corresponds to its true corresponding identity. The
date of the rst Twitter post was collected by going to each users rst page of posts and
recording the date of the earliest one.
4. Voting data from 2008 was collected from http://clerk.house.gov/. The variable party votes
corresponds to the percentage of votes in favor of the presidential candidate corresponding
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to the representatives party loyalties. The percentage of votes in favor of the representative
himself/herself is captured by the variable representative votes.
5. Each representative belongs to as few as 0 and as many as 4 committees. We identify which
committees each representative belongs to by going to each committees website and looking
up its membership. The committees that we consider are the committees on agriculture,
appropriations, armed service, budget, education, energy, nancial services, foreign relations,
homeland security, house administration, economic, taxation, judiciary, natural resources,
oversight, intelligence, rules, science and technology, small business, o¢ cial conduct, trans-
portation and infrastructure, and ways and means.
6. We include the number of bills sponsored by each representative in our analysis. This infor-
mation is obtained for the 111th House of Representatives (2009-2010). Furthermore, we can
also identify all representatives that are chairs or ranked members of committees. The data
was collected on June 11, 2010.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
log(Population) 13.364 0.214 10.96 15.2 438
log(Income) 10.643 0.262 9.620 11.43 438
Percentage black 12.637 15.963 0 96.400 438
Gender 0.167 0.373 0 1 438
Black 0.082 0.275 0 1 438
Catholic 0.292 0.455 0 1 438
Law 0.352 0.478 0 1 438
Ivy 0.098 0.298 0 1 438
Age 57.333 10.16 28 86 438
Incumbent 0.861 0.347 0 1 438
Tenure 9.550 8.711 0 54 438
Democrat 0.598 0.491 0 1 438
Party votes 0.516 0.1 0 0.963 432
Representative votes 0.656 0.124 0.268 1 427
Number of committees 1.936 0.826 0 4 438
MySpace 0.014 0.116 0 1 438
RSS 0.573 0.495 0 1 438
Flickr 0.151 0.358 0 1 438
Facebook 0.571 0.496 0 1 438
Youtube 0.731 0.444 0 1 438
Adoption in state network 5.849 6.104 0 22 438
Adoption in committee network 28.902 18.506 0 78 438
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Table 2: Propensity to adopt Twitter
(1) (2) (3)
Adopt Adopt Adopt
log(Population) 0.904 (0.379) 0.866 (0.360) -0.337 (1.557)
log(Income) 0.190 (0.285) 0.194 (0.291) 0.327 (0.320)
Percentage black 0.00410 (0.00544) 0.00460 (0.00549) 0.00324 (0.00559)
Gender 0.263 (0.177) 0.303 (0.182) 0.244 (0.186)
Black -0.229 (0.315) -0.280 (0.325) -0.383 (0.327)
Catholic 0.0901 (0.157) 0.102 (0.158) 0.0441 (0.166)
Law 0.0394 (0.142) 0.0505 (0.143) 0.00542 (0.153)
Ivy 0.330 (0.226) 0.362 (0.233) 0.306 (0.240)
Age -0.00995 (0.00792) -0.0269 (0.0127) -0.00625 (0.00838)
Incumbent -0.302 (0.213) -0.258 (0.224) -0.495 (0.232)
Tenure -0.00624 (0.0108) -0.0231 (0.0462) -0.0101 (0.0115)
Democrat -0.802 (0.154) -1.026 (0.238) -0.787 (0.171)
Number of committees -0.0177 (0.0868) -0.0166 (0.0875) -0.0192 (0.0902)
MySpace 0.785 (0.729) 0.742 (0.693) 1.050 (0.744)
RSS 0.234 (0.141) 0.226 (0.143) 0.233 (0.151)
Flickr 0.400 (0.185) 0.385 (0.185) 0.317 (0.199)
Facebook 0.691 (0.151) -0.778 (0.773) 0.763 (0.163)
Youtube 0.158 (0.175) 0.189 (0.178) 0.139 (0.188)
Facebook * Tenure 0.000253 (0.000692)
Facebook * Age 0.0223 (0.0134)
Facebook * Democrat 0.348 (0.282)
Party votes -0.0749 (0.774)
Representative votes 1.736 (0.675)
Constant -13.83 (5.762) -12.34 (5.652) 0.120 (20.97)
Observations 438 438 396
McFadden R2 0.189 0.197 0.189
BIC 598.1 612.1 551.8
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 3: Speed of adoption: main results
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
log(Population) -33.45 (22.90) -32.22 (22.71) -43.06 (29.53)
log(Income) 2.140 (4.637) 1.383 (4.282) 0.941 (5.491)
Percentage black -0.0704 (0.0747) -0.0860 (0.0798) -0.0909 (0.0871)
Gender -2.662 (1.689) -2.682 (1.717) -2.320 (2.177)
Black -0.300 (3.551) 0.495 (3.995) -0.688 (3.830)
Catholic -1.669 (1.817) -0.978 (1.641) -0.957 (1.520)
Law -0.446 (1.656) -0.390 (1.819) -1.278 (2.476)
Ivy -3.026 (1.841) -2.930 (1.726) -2.931 (2.556)
Age -0.0348 (0.0806) -0.0334 (0.0852) -0.0928 (0.102)
Incumbent -0.608 (1.972) -1.175 (2.033) 0.154 (2.736)
Tenure 0.0594 (0.121) 0.0906 (0.125) 0.158 (0.127)
Democrat 2.109 (1.672) 2.358 (1.606) 2.350 (1.828)
Party votes 7.464 (9.688) 8.109 (9.104) 6.080 (10.81)
Representative votes -0.422 (6.476) 0.279 (6.534) 0.587 (7.192)
Number of committees -0.365 (0.979) -4.187 (1.739) 6.818 (5.233)
MySpace -4.409 (2.110) -3.861 (2.336) -3.898 (3.250)
RSS 1.648 (2.102) 2.180 (2.311) 2.245 (3.176)
Flickr 1.553 (1.747) 1.412 (1.707) 1.705 (1.998)
Facebook -2.818 (2.423) -2.619 (2.432) -3.445 (3.220)
Youtube -3.772 (3.879) -3.368 (3.783) -2.512 (3.384)
Adoption in state network 0.139 (0.166) 0.420 (0.324) 0.415 (0.363)
Adoption in committee network -0.161 (0.0699) -0.265 (0.102) -0.253 (0.117)
Democrats in state network -0.0647 (0.141) -0.108 (0.167)
Democrats in committee network 0.194 (0.0774) -0.267 (0.200)
Constant 437.6 (342.7) 426.2 (338.0) 579.2 (440.4)
Committee controls No No Yes
Observations 180 180 180
R2 0.1473 0.1776 0.2563
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 4: Speed of adoption: robustness checks
(1) (2)
Days to adopt Days to adopt
log(Population) -45.52 (29.59) -42.33 (28.86)
log(Income) 0.0449 (5.528) 0.874 (5.449)
Percentage black -0.104 (0.0867) -0.0902 (0.0817)
Gender -2.142 (2.171) -2.330 (2.236)
Black -0.324 (3.685) -2.658 (3.328)
Catholic -0.215 (1.611) -0.530 (1.811)
Law -1.297 (2.435) -0.792 (2.351)
Ivy -3.465 (2.453) -3.600 (2.629)
Age -0.0973 (0.100) -0.108 (0.102)
Incumbent -0.255 (2.619) -0.477 (2.760)
Tenure 0.172 (0.121) 0.184 (0.117)
Democrat 2.370 (1.751) 2.042 (1.916)
Party votes 4.968 (10.61) 4.410 (12.10)
Representative votes 0.550 (7.218) 6.060 (6.593)
Number of committees 3.962 (5.419) 6.474 (5.343)
MySpace -4.528 (3.529) -3.351 (3.300)
RSS 2.438 (3.192) 1.889 (3.036)
Flickr 1.624 (1.981) 1.414 (2.047)
Facebook -3.263 (3.200) -2.489 (2.903)
Youtube -3.302 (3.377) -3.377 (3.595)
Adoption in state network 0.415 (0.365)
Adoption in committee network -0.341 (0.126)
Democrats in state network -0.0882 (0.162) 0.00500 (0.107)
Democrats in committee network -0.145 (0.214) -0.305 (0.197)
Month-year time dummy 0.256 (0.107) 0.213 (0.116)
Percentage adoption in state network -4.915 (7.372)
Percentage adoption in committee network -19.16 (9.983)
Constant 619.3 (441.8) 569.0 (430.7)
Committee controls Yes Yes
Observations 180 180
R2 0.2783 0.2611
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 5: Speed of adoption: by party specic peer e¤ects
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
log(Population) -31.86 (22.70) -31.03 (23.01) -31.78 (22.78)
log(Income) 1.525 (4.273) 2.137 (4.493) 1.481 (4.259)
Percentage black -0.0783 (0.0774) -0.0726 (0.0776) -0.0814 (0.0790)
Gender -3.084 (1.657) -2.461 (1.651) -2.695 (1.615)
Black 0.0303 (3.647) -0.280 (3.819) 0.612 (3.728)
Catholic -0.959 (1.677) -0.993 (1.684) -0.763 (1.675)
Law 0.435 (1.807) -0.657 (1.688) 0.257 (1.735)
Ivy -3.044 (1.752) -2.914 (1.888) -3.040 (1.702)
Age -0.0634 (0.0849) -0.0788 (0.0875) -0.0761 (0.0888)
Incumbent -0.670 (2.023) -0.771 (1.991) -0.885 (2.019)
Tenure 0.0970 (0.119) 0.103 (0.128) 0.138 (0.126)
Democrat 0.680 (1.674) 2.786 (2.288) 2.350 (2.174)
Party votes 8.623 (8.863) 4.933 (9.979) 5.906 (8.320)
Representative votes 2.935 (6.311) -0.525 (6.390) 1.956 (6.468)
Number of committees -3.971 (1.623) -3.815 (1.748) -4.160 (1.672)
MySpace -5.101 (2.265) -2.672 (1.842) -5.356 (2.153)
RSS 1.179 (2.257) 1.911 (2.282) 1.036 (2.313)
Flickr 1.807 (1.686) 2.367 (1.743) 2.072 (1.669)
Facebook -2.186 (2.273) -2.741 (2.477) -1.964 (2.227)
Youtube -2.702 (3.979) -3.937 (4.092) -2.897 (4.115)
Democrats in state network 0.0438 (0.0855) -0.0556 (0.121) -0.00358 (0.115)
Democrats in committee network 0.179 (0.0718) 0.0824 (0.0562) 0.195 (0.0732)
Adoption in state network (D) -0.0550 (0.613) -0.403 (0.602)
Adoption in state network (R) 0.567 (0.679) 0.733 (0.604)
Adoption in committee network (D) 0.460 (0.204) 0.471 (0.216)
Adoption in committee network (R) -0.614 (0.153) -0.640 (0.169)
Constant 419.5 (338.6) 407.2 (342.2) 420.0 (340.0)
Observations 180 180 180
R2 0.1959 0.1391 0.2127
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 6: Speed of adoption: evidence of social learning
(1) (2)
Days to adopt Days to adopt
log(Population) -33.30 (21.68) -33.66 (22.77)
log(Income) 3.670 (4.229) 2.340 (4.780)
Percentage black -0.0711 (0.0750) -0.0638 (0.0740)
Gender -3.013 (1.755) -2.586 (1.697)
Black -0.132 (3.519) -0.395 (3.839)
Catholic -2.591 (2.018) -1.990 (1.864)
Law -0.730 (1.616) -0.591 (1.718)
Ivy -2.362 (1.852) -3.132 (1.839)
Age 0.00251 (0.0908) -0.0406 (0.0805)
Incumbent -0.371 (1.872) -0.530 (1.966)
Tenure -0.0154 (0.116) 0.291 (0.255)
Democrat 2.364 (1.670) 2.073 (1.664)
Party votes 5.852 (9.843) 5.695 (10.17)
Republican votes 3.217 (6.474) -0.560 (6.619)
Number of committees -0.611 (1.012) -0.115 (0.995)
MySpace -3.258 (2.090) -5.355 (2.636)
RSS 1.362 (1.934) 1.554 (2.075)
Flickr 2.275 (1.799) 1.359 (1.767)
Facebook -10.36 (5.605) -2.380 (2.356)
Youtube -3.594 (3.718) -3.724 (3.849)
Adoption in state network 0.152 (0.173) 0.294 (0.226)
Adoption in committee network -0.0673 (0.0666) -0.111 (0.0801)
Non-Facebook * Adoption in state network -0.686 (0.729)
Non-Facebook * Adoption in committee network -0.348 (0.192)
Tenure * Adoption in state network -0.0162 (0.0160)
Tenure * Adoption in committee network -0.00822 (0.00780)
Constant 422.4 (318.4) 437.4 (340.9)
Observations 180 180
R2 0.2006 0.1600
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 7: Speed of adoption: sensitivity to inauguration date
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
log(Population) -35.52 (16.80) -69.99 (25.14) -90.90 (29.70)
log(Income) 2.546 (4.350) 0.639 (5.277) -0.320 (6.442)
Percentage black -0.115 (0.0972) -0.210 (0.119) -0.293 (0.144)
Gender -3.068 (2.887) -2.652 (3.616) -5.654 (4.173)
Black 1.668 (6.480) 5.069 (8.445) 6.631 (9.801)
Catholic -1.592 (2.245) -2.629 (2.553) -6.148 (3.265)
Law -1.195 (2.032) -1.316 (2.400) 1.144 (3.244)
Ivy -4.074 (3.420) -5.927 (4.084) -9.351 (5.605)
Age -0.109 (0.118) -0.135 (0.141) -0.164 (0.187)
Incumbent -1.852 (2.944) -2.522 (3.646) -2.371 (5.105)
Tenure 0.123 (0.151) 0.137 (0.176) 0.0545 (0.219)
Democrat 1.452 (2.224) 2.280 (2.559) 3.705 (3.392)
Party votes 7.515 (10.31) 10.05 (13.52) 25.54 (16.41)
Representative votes 2.315 (9.506) 0.328 (11.26) -6.787 (13.80)
Number of committees -5.158 (2.255) -5.573 (2.903) -7.069 (3.644)
MySpace -4.805 (6.424) -1.614 (9.635) 0.266 (10.63)
RSS 2.502 (2.144) 3.500 (2.545) 3.083 (3.339)
Flickr 2.118 (2.443) 0.855 (2.870) -0.893 (3.719)
Facebook -3.013 (2.383) -3.788 (2.700) -3.685 (3.357)
Youtube -4.164 (2.928) -3.023 (3.248) -4.854 (4.008)
Adoption in state network 0.230 (0.363) 0.137 (0.408) -0.0282 (0.493)
Adoption in committee network -0.274 (0.0961) -0.329 (0.107) -0.368 (0.122)
Democrats in state network 0.0202 (0.150) 0.0851 (0.177) 0.159 (0.223)
Democrats in committee network 0.207 (0.0918) 0.240 (0.113) 0.271 (0.142)
Constant 465.8 (228.2) 950.1 (344.8) 1246.3 (406.9)
Observations 151 126 94
R2 0.2410 0.2951 0.3954
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 8: Ex post Twitter usage and adoption speed
(1) (2) (3)
Tweets per day Followers per day Following per day
Days to adopt -0.000551 (0.00502) 0.0349 (0.0406) 0.0132 (0.0268)
Constant 0.766 (0.0623) 5.433 (0.503) 1.867 (0.332)
Observations 182 182 182
R2 0.0001 0.0041 0.0014
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 9: Opportunity cost of Twitter usage
(1) (2) (3)
Tweets per day Tweets per day Tweets per day
Tweets per day
Number of committees -0.0599 (0.0794) -0.0699 (0.0682) -0.0968 (0.0674)
MySpace -0.676 (0.370) -0.673 (0.370) -0.732 (0.384)
RSS -0.0930 (0.122) -0.0921 (0.122) -0.111 (0.126)
Flickr 0.179 (0.144) 0.182 (0.144) 0.167 (0.150)
Facebook -0.329 (0.157) -0.320 (0.152) -0.352 (0.160)
Youtube 0.0436 (0.170) 0.0386 (0.170) 0.0236 (0.174)
Bills -0.00770 (0.00421) -0.00766 (0.00420)
Chair 0.178 (0.198) 0.194 (0.195)
Adoption in state network 0.00592 (0.0132)
Adoption in committee network -0.00141 (0.00461)
Constant 1.718 (0.354) 1.725 (0.350) 1.765 (0.370)
Adopt
log(Population) 0.872 (0.668) 0.872 (0.668) 0.904 (0.679)
log(Income) 0.0921 (0.291) 0.0921 (0.291) 0.190 (0.287)
Percentage black 0.00616 (0.00626) 0.00616 (0.00626) 0.00410 (0.00622)
Gender 0.214 (0.194) 0.214 (0.194) 0.263 (0.192)
Black -0.427 (0.365) -0.427 (0.365) -0.229 (0.354)
Catholic 0.0892 (0.155) 0.0892 (0.155) 0.0901 (0.153)
Law 0.0402 (0.145) 0.0402 (0.145) 0.0394 (0.143)
Ivy league 0.377 (0.229) 0.377 (0.229) 0.330 (0.227)
Age -0.0120 (0.00797) -0.0120 (0.00797) -0.00995 (0.00788)
Incumbent -0.336 (0.215) -0.336 (0.215) -0.302 (0.214)
Tenure -0.00844 (0.0109) -0.00844 (0.0109) -0.00624 (0.0102)
Democrat -0.932 (0.162) -0.932 (0.162) -0.802 (0.153)
Number of committees -0.0391 (0.0852) -0.0391 (0.0852) -0.0177 (0.0839)
MySpace 0.820 (0.628) 0.820 (0.628) 0.785 (0.624)
RSS 0.220 (0.142) 0.220 (0.142) 0.234 (0.141)
Flickr 0.405 (0.190) 0.405 (0.190) 0.400 (0.190)
Facebook 0.702 (0.152) 0.702 (0.152) 0.691 (0.150)
Youtube 0.120 (0.179) 0.120 (0.179) 0.158 (0.176)
Bills 0.0184 (0.00620) 0.0184 (0.00620)
Chair -0.0244 (0.236) -0.0244 (0.236)
Constant -12.39 (9.559) -12.39 (9.559) -13.83 (9.649)
Mills
lambda -0.623 (0.197) -0.621 (0.194) -0.685 (0.213)
Observations 438 438 438
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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